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AilS TRACT
An Evalutation of Land Use

Controls in Logan, Utah
by
William Ear l Ku ttler
Master of Science
Utah State University, 1975
Major Professor: Dr . W. Cris Lewis
Department:

Economic

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the role of economic,
political, and religious power as it relates to a person's ability to
get zoning decisions passed in his favor by the Logan City Commission
and the Logan Planning and Zoning Commission.

Data for the s tudy was

collected from the minutes of the Planning and Zoning Commission and
the City Commission ,

The theory behind the incentives to seek zoning

alterations is discussed prior to the actual work.

(83 pages)

CHAPTER I
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Although land use planning and l and controls have been used for
several hundred years, there has been a great i ncr ease in interest in
these instruments at all levels of government in the past two decades.
In fact , the majori t y of the urban c enter s in the United State now have
some type of master plan and zon i ng ord inance .
At present, there are many diff erent land use propo sa ls pending at
the national , s tate, and local l evels .

One that has received

considerable attention in Cache County is the State Land Use Act passed
by the Utah State Legislature in 19 74 , but later voted down in a
referendum.

Prior to its rejection, the Herald Journal stated that:

"L ike their con s tituents, the five men who make up
Cache County's state legislative del ega tion are still
divided over the Utah Land Use Act with opinions ranging
from outright contempt to cautious approval to wholehearted support." (5, p. 1)

This statement illustrates the concern people have regarding land use
planning and controls.

It also indicates that there are many diverse

opinions concerning the use of pr iva te property and controls thereon .
The article further stated that, "All five , however, were able to
agree on one major point -- their vo tes for or against hinged on the
issue of local control over land use planning." (5, p. 1)

"I'm just

as king people to read it, I don't believe many people are taking the
time to read or study it (the new State Act) ."

(5, p. 1)

This same concern and confusion also exists in regar d to planni ng

and controls on the local level,

Fur t hermore, the quo t e concerning

state controls is applicable to local controls; that is, t ha t few peop l e
are taking the time to read or study the land use controls being
est abl ished by their local governments.

The citizens of Logan, Utah

have had to deal with these issues in the past and will most cer tainly
be confronted with other land use planning issues in the f uture,

As

the population of Cache County grows and the economic base expands , t he
l and available for these new activities will become mo r e s carce.
People are beginning to see that land is a limited resource and ever yone
wants his "rights" to be protected,

Th e commer cial and indus trial

communities want to be able to expand in the way that is mos t pro f itable
to them; the residents of the city want to be able to obtain the type
of housing they desire and can afford; everyone wan t s l and to suit
their recreational needs; and others want to maintain l and i n its
pr istine co ndition or to "protect 11 agricultural l ands.

Because of these fac t ors, everyone is affec t ed by zoning deci s ions.
If property is zoned for commercial use, generally it takes on a much
higher value than, say, land zoned for agricu l tural use.

A s imila r

pr i ce diffe r ential exists between land zoned for sing l e fami ly
r esidences and mul t i-family dwellings.

\<hat can or can't be built on

a piece of prop e r ty and what size the proper t y must be ar e also issues
of pr imary concern.
Land use planning in Cache Valley began with the f i r s t permanent
se ttl ers.

As t he Mormo n pioneers settled Logan, they se t out the

st r ee t s, block sizes, and lo t sizes.

I t is easy t o se e the effects of

this initial planning.
east-west.

The original streets all run north-south or

The blocks are all of uniform size with mos t city lots of

about the same width and depth.

The commercial community was purposely

located on the main arterial roads leading to and from town.
}fure recently, land use planning in Logan has t aken the form of
master planning with zoning laws.

The first master plan containing a

zoning ordinance map for the community was developed in 1962.

It

delineated areas to be used for various types of housing districts,
commercial districts, and industrial districts.

Since that time, there

have been numerous changes and revisions to the original zoning map.

Indeed, the city

plannin~

board meets regularly to discuss proposed

changes in the current zoning ordinance .

There is a full time

assistant planner employed by the city to assist in the solutions of
problems concerning land use planning and zoning in the community.
The value of such urban land control in the present context is a
subject of much controversy.

(28)

There are those who believe that

zoning laws are not only beneficial but absolu tely necessary for
orderly growth and efficient land use.
are valid.

Their reasons are many and some

For example, they cite the tremendous population growth of

certain places in the United States and the associated land use
demands.

A sense of logic tells them th at this growth must be planned

and controlled to properly utilize scarce land resources.
The existence of externalities are of principal concern to those

individuals favoring public control of private land.

Zoning laws are

seen as a means of controlling negative externalities such as excessive
noise, air pollution, heavy traffic, etc., while at the same time
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promo t ing positive ext e r nalities such as homogenous neighbo r hoods,
parks, and schools.

Since the land area of t he coun try is fixe d while

population is not, it follows that if everyone is to have the i r demands
met, plans need to be made and controls exe rc ised .
Some promoters of government cont rols on private land f ore s ee the
day when, in the absence of controls, people will abuse land to the
point that it will lose its productivity.

There is some fe ar th a t

uncontrolled subdivision expansion will use the best farm land and
thereby diminish the agricultural potential of the country .

In

essen ce, some promoter s express a Malthusian view of the United States
about land use planning and zoning; that is, that misus e of thi s res ource
(land) will lead to a s ub sistence economy.

(7, preface)

Another imp lied reason for zoning ordinances is evidenced in
natur e.

Rac ial prejudices exis t and zoning prov ides a legal method of

promoting segr egation .

By enforcing lot sizes and dwelling requirements,

the poor and minorities can be separated from high class neighborhoods.
On the oth er h and, many be lievers in the ma rket sys tem, as well as
other critics, doubt t hat zoning laws accomplish any t hing.

In fact,

they even go as far as to state that land resource control through
zoning may result i n costly misallocations of resources.

(20, p. 90)

Fur th ermore, there are some who believe that th e market forces
typically overcome zoning laws.
evidence to support these claims .

Indeed, there app ear s to be substantial
For example, the high percentages

of zoning petitions t ha t are usually granted would suggest this.
Due to the increased market segregation and pr ice differential s
th at come in to being because of zoning ordinances , large ec onomic

rents stand to be gained.

It would be r e asonable to assume tha t

individuals capable of obtaining zoning changes in their favor would
capture these economic rents.

This paper will explore what effect

three variables, economic pmver, political power, and religious power,

have on an individual's ability to obtain favorable zoning decisions .
TI1e null hypothesis to be test ed is that individuals possessing
relatively more economic, polit ical , and religious power, are no more

successf ul than individuals with relat ively less power in capturing
these economic rents as s ociated with zoning changes .

That is,

suppose an individual possessing considerable economic and political
power owned a parcel of land zoned single family residential.
parcel of property has a current value of $10,000 .00.

This

If the zoning on

this particular parcel could be changed to multiple family residential,
the value would change to $14,000.00.

The null hypothesis states that

this individual will have no be tter chance of gett ing his property
rezoned than any other land owner r eg ardless of the owner ' s economic

and political prestige.

There fore, he has no better chance of obtaining

the $4,000.00 windfall than any other land owner .
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CHAPTER II
LAND USE PLANNING AND CONTROLS, A REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Overview

One of the means that governments have devised to enable them to
regulate l and uses within their jurisdiction is zoning .

These

ordina nces are made law by enac t ment wit h the aid of hearings, etc ., by
the local governing body, which r e tains t he right t o amend them as
deemed necessar y .

Zoning ordinances have customarily required highly

s tructured and predetermined patterns of land use as well as separation
of differen t residential densities in the community .

(21, p. 58)

In

addition to this, most zoning regulations s et s tandards for minimum
floor siz e, off s treet parking , s id ewa lks, building height, and lot
sizes .

(2, p . 11-1 2; 22 , p . 58-59; 27, p . 80-81)

Different t ypes of land us e co ntrol s have be en practiced by more
advanced socie t ies for centuries, although zoning as commonly known is
a relatively recent concept.

The history of zo ning as a land use

control in America can be divided ar b itrari l y into three stages .

First,

there was a s truggl e in the early decades of the twentieth century to
per s uad e the court s that comprehensive public regulation of pr iva t e
land was not a n unconstitutional interference with a person's rights
regard i ng his property .

Second , there was a period of about thirty

years until the middle of the 1960 ' s when the courts showed increasing
sympathy with muni cip al land use regulat i ons, thereby encouraging
municipalities to extend the concepts of public health, safety, morals,

and general welfare to embrace more sophisticated and complex methods
of regulation.

The final period is just underway and is marked by

many challenges to municipal preeminence i n zoning .
favorable and unfavorable court decisions

re~arding

(2, p. 38)

Both

the legality of

zoning, accompanied by attempts to empirically quantify the rights and
wrongs of zoning as a land use control, have come forth in this last
phase .
The first comprehensive

zonin~

ordinance in the United States was

pass ed in 1916 as a result of political pressures applied by me r chants
of New York's Fifth Avenue.

(24, p. 171-184)

Motivated by fear of a

growing group of peddler s and unwanted sa lesmen, these merchan ts pushed
for the pass age of the ordinance to ensure the status of t he area .

Fr om

this first ordinance until after Wor ld War II , zoning remained
principally a central city concept.

1

After l<or l d War I I, t he s uburb s

and sma l ler communities began utilizing zoning as a means of r egul at i ng
the use of private land.

(12, p. 62-63)
Rationale for Zoning

There have been several r easons of f ered to justify l and use l aws.
It is generally assumed that zoning laws are theoretically suppor ted by
desirable land use and environmental goals.

(24, p. 171-184 )

For

example, New York's 19 16 ordinance had the goal of c l eanin g up Fi f th
Avenue and then of retaining the character that had tradit ionally
prevailed.

(12, p. 62-63)

1
The term "Central City" refers to the fact that prior to World
War II zoning ordinance s were used sparingly in the subur bs and smalle r
cities. These ordinances were used principally in larger ci t ies .
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"Zon ing is not .iust an expansion of common law of
nuisance. Jt seeks to achieve much more than the removal

of obnoxious gases and unsightly uses . Under l ying the
ent ire concept of zoning is the assump tion that zoning can
be a vi t a l tool for maintaining a civilized fo r m of
existence onlv if we employ the i nsigh ts and learning of
the phi l osopher, the city planner, the eco nomis t, the
so ciologist, the public health exper t and all other
professions concerned with urban probl ems ." (32, p . 21)
Supporters of zoning as a l and u se contro l stress the concepts of
public health, safety, morals, and general we lfare as th e reaso ns for
zoning.

(2, p. 38)

concept.

There are certainly many examples to support thi s

One need only look at some of the large foreign cities that

exis t «i t hout contro l s of any type.

Popula tion densities are so high

that public heal t h isn 't feasible .

r.hetto landlords have been accused ,

and rightfully so , of s upplying i nadequate and uns afe housing which
diminishes the safe t y and welf are of th e populous .
More recently, planners have begun to consider neighborhood
effects (i.e., externalities) such as no is e, traff ic and congestion.
Surely the majori t y of Americans wou ld prefer living in nei ghborhood s
wher e peace and quiet exist and where they don 't need to constantly
worr y about their children being killed in the heavy tr affic .

In this

age of awareness of our environment, people are now concerned about

nois e and air po llution and feel they have the right to live in areas
free from these problems .

Zoning, then, is one method designed to

control these problems and allo« people to live near others with simi lar
l ifes t yl es.

(10, p . 79 - 99; 15, p . 96)

Ther e are several other jus tif ica t ions fo r land use laws <lhich
have mer i t.

Large externalit y producing fac tories operating twenty-four

hours a day and single family r esiden tial homes cer tainly aren't
compatible land uses.

Zoning is viewed as a method of excluding such

undesirable uses from the neighborhood .

(2, p. 3-5)

Poor people often

have more children than middle and higher income families and thus may
inc re ase per capita education costs.

In addition, lm-1 cost housing

provides less tax revenues than does more expensive housing.

Land use

controls can be used to limit or exclude minority groups o r poor people
from a neighborhood, and by doing so, can help to maintain a favo rable
tax base.

(2, p. 3-5 ; 26, p. 1-1 6)

The aesthetics of land use is another impor tant reason for zoning .
Throu gh the effective use of zoning laws, pub lic authorities can
require that buildings be designed to reflect high levels of " quality"
and also to provide more stimulating relationships between different
uses .

(17 , p. 23-33 )

Zoning can also help preserve landmarks and

architectural and historical sites.

Some arg ue, therefore , th at zoning

is a useful tool to preserve the aesthetic values of an area.

(23, p . 1-5)

Another ra tionale for zoning not often discussed i s the oppo rtunity
i t provides fo r large economic gains.

For examp le, suppose that an

individual owned a one ac re parcel zoned for single fami l y residential
use.

This acre subdi vi ded in t o four single fami l y residential (R-1)

lots might sel l for $5,000.00 a lot or $20,000.00 for the parcel .

If

the owner co uld obtain a zoning change, say to a multiple dwelling
designation (R-3) , the property could be so ld for, say, $27 ,000.00,
giving a $7,000.00 windfall to the land owner. 1

This economi c rent

comes into existence because of the way zoning laws effect the supply
of land.

By limiting the supply of land for multip le family dwellings

1
An R-3 zo ning designation r efers to land zoned for multi ple
family dwellings. An R-1 designation refers to land zoned for single
fami l y residences.
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the price for this land increases.

The individual that is s ucc es sf ul

in moving his product from one market to another market o ff ering a
higher price stands to gain considerably.
Zoning Typcc_
Fiscal zoning refers to practices that seek to attract uses which
~<ill

produce a high tax base while excludino consumers of large

amounts of public services.

(2, p. 3-5; 19, p. 69; 26, p. 3)

Another

type of zoning which is similar to fiscal zoning is large l ot zoning .
This is used to maintain property valuation and scenic value by

enforcing a minimum lot size that is considerably larger than is needed
to promote public health and morals.

Other purposes of lar ge l o t

zoning and fiscal zoning are to maintain the tax base , to pre serve
social homogeniety, i.e., to promote and retain a semi- rural a t mosphe re.

(26, p. 4-6)
Zoning laws designed as a method of preserving communi t y
characteristics and of avoiding certain types of resident i al grow th are
referred to as exclusionary zoning.

(26, p. l)

Ano th e r type of zon i ng

is conditional zoning which typically amounts to lit t le more than
rezoning.

That is, when an area is rezoned from one use or c las sification

to anot her and the cha nge is subject to some t ype of cond i tion, this
cons t itutes conditional zoning.
is still questioned.

The legality of t his t y pe of r e gulation

(21, p. 59; 28, p. 96)

The net effect of the justifications for land use con trol seems to
be to exclude certain land uses and to provide home owners with
substa ntial power over the use of vacant land in their communities.
is this public control of private land that has led to the many lega l

It

II

decisions both pro and con regarding zoning.

(21, p. 76)

Resource Hisallocation
Human resource misallocation

One of the often underestimated effects of zoning is its effect
on human resources.

land is needed.

As factories expand and modernize, more accessible

The suburbs become the ideal place to locate because

commercial land is cheaper and easier to locate.

As factories relocate

in the suburbs, the resulting decline in the number of blue co llar jobs
offered in the city centers can cause serious unemployment problems,

since these job shifts tend to be non reversible.

(12, p. 64-65)

As

factories offering blue collar jobs move to the suburbs , poor people
living in inner city neighborhoods must commute , which is often
difficult, or find themselves unemployed.
Between 1952 and 1966, "a U.S. Bureau of the Census s tudy found
t hat while the number of jobs in St. Louis dropped by 50,000 , they rose
in nearby suburbs by nearly 193,500."

(27, p. 80)

Studies in

Philadelphia and New York revealed similar results.
If it isn't financially feasible for the residents of the poorer
central distric t s to conunute, one would ask:
th e suburbs where the _iobs are?

lfuy don't they move to

"Probably the most dreaded land use in

America is for homes of low-income persons or families t.Jith incomes

lower than those of the present residents."

(21, p. 61)

This is, in

fa ct , one of the primary interests of zoning, to main tain the state of
the neighborhood.

This type of human resource misal l ocation is another

t opic and will be treated under "Exclusion and Segregation ."
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In summary, space is unavailable in central cities for mode rn

manufacturing, causing jobs to diminish i n central cities.

In the

last twenty-five years, 75 percent to 85 percent of the nation's
central area j obs were creat ed or moved to the suburbs .

In some cases ,

zoning laws have made it difficult,if not impossib le, for the poor t o
gain access to sub urban housing .

Non-access to suburban housing for

the poor means non-access to suburban jobs, v hich means more unemployment

and results in labor misallocation.

(12, p. 62-65)

Zoning and marke t determined land use
As stated earlier, a zoning ordinance is mad e law by enactment

by the local governing body, which may ame nd it as well.

Gener a lly,

zoning has required highly structured and predetermined patterns of
land use as well as separation of di f fer ent residen tial densities.

With

time, pressures for land use change dev elop in the commun ity and conditions
are usually not the same as th ey were wh en the land was origina lly
zoned.

It is also possible that the land was not zone d fo r use i n the

firs t place.

The right to amend the zoning ordinance allows off icials

to remedy such conditions.

Rezonin~

app l ications are typically in

response to pre ss ures of the market for more intensive use of land or
for a change from one category of use to ano ther for which there is a
greater demand.

The new uses are likely to be for higher uses (e . g . ,

multiple-family dwellings, commercial structures, etc.) whi ch are apt
to command higher economic returns.

(21, p . 60)

This thesis focuses

on the amount of informal power individua ls seeking zoning amendments
have and the role it plays in cap tu ring these higher economic returns.
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It is natural for simila r land uses to cluster, that is fo r heav y
industry to center in certain lo ca tions, for single fami l y residences

to deve lop at certain places and for r e t ail co ncerns to group .

"To

t he extent that zoning simply recognizes the natura l process, it
changes nothing and causes no loss."

(22, p. 58)

Zoning does tend to segregate the real estate market more
extensively than does t he market process.

Old sectors of ci t ies t hat

were developed prior to zoning ordinances have a multiplicity of
housing densit i es, that is, single family residences are intermingled
with a variety of multiple family dwellings such as duplexes and fourplexes, etc.

Zoning ordinances usually conta in a multiplic ity of

residential and commercial uses (i.e . , R-1, R-2, R-3, C-1, C-2 , C-3).
Th is res ult s in areas of more defined use, that is, single fami l y

dwellings in one area and two and fo ur fami ly dwellings in ye t another
area.

Houston, the nation's sixth larges t city, has not been zoned and

does not appear to he any worse off in regards to congestion , pollution,
and other negative externalities than any other large c ity; possibly
it is better off .

Growth has occurred at least as orderly as in zoned

cities and wi th less planning and administrative costs.

Instead of

using zoning laws to control the use of land, private restrictive
land covenants

'~;.~ere

used.

These restrictive covenants \vere more

permanent and predictable than zoning laws and have served to segregate
conflicting land uses in an acceptab le manner,

~nd

in many people's

opinion, a more efficient way.
Siegan, in his study on Houston and i ts absence of zoning laws ,
presents several conclusions:

1)

economic forces tend to make for a
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separation of land uses even without zoning;

2) when economic forces

don't provide for this separation, land owners may use private tools
such as restrictive covenants to secure higher prof its;

3) zoning

tends t o keep more areas s trictly singl e fami l y residences ;

4) when

restrictive covenant s expire, land will be used as economic pressures

indi cate; and 5) zoning restricts the supply of some uses and thereby
prevents some demands from be ing satisfied .

(29, p. 142)

Houston has

shown that a no-zoning situation may be no more chaotic or haphazard

than zoning.

The closer the district is to full development, the more

predictable will be the fu ture of its vacant property .

(12, p . 132)

One of the major weakness e s of zoning is its susceptibility t o
change under private pressure.

(16, p. 48-49)

If rezoning applica t ions

are simply expressions of market forces , the frequency wi th which
these requests are granted would give some indication as to wha t
influence the market has on zoning ordinances.

In a 1968 s urvey on

cities of over 5,000 population, information was requested concerning:
1) how many rezoning petitions per year were approved in whole or in
part; and 2) how many zoning variances were acted upon for the same
time.

Those rezoning petitions acted upon averaged 11 per reporting

government unit and about 73 percent were approved in who le or i n part.
Requests for zoning variances ave:aged about twenty-four per r epo rting
government and about 78 percent of these were approved .
of this study were that:

The conclusions

1) many zoning changes in these communi ties

would not have occurred if there had been a general adherence to some
f orm of master plan; and 2) control of property through zo ning is more
chaotic than it is orderly.

A similar study in Kentucky showed that

63 percent of the petitions for change were granted in the absence of

15
objectors .

(28, p. 17)

With such a high percentage of rezoning

petitions granted , one would assume that the natural wo rk i ngs of the
market do, in reali t y, have a great impact on land us e ev en i n the
presence of zoning ordinances.

La nd misall ocation
As shown in the previous section, there are many who a r gue th a t

zoning has little effect on land use.

Others fee l tha t zoni ng laws

not o n ly have failed to do what they were designed for, but a ctua l l y
lead to irredeemable misal locations of resources and, ther e fo re , that
zoning laws ought to be repealed.

(22, p. 58)

When housing is i nvo l ved, a zoning controversy is not simp l y one
of municipali t y ver sus peop l e, or a case of peop l e ver s us property ; i t
is one of peop l e versus people.

It tends to give i nordinate powers a nd

privilege s to existing r esidents over people outside the community who
would stand to benefit from the filtering effect cre a t ed by new ho us ing ,
as well as those within t he housing market who would benefi t f rom a
great e r supply of both land and housing.

1

(28, p . 8 7)

Ano t he r primary weakness of zoning as a l and use co ntrol is that
i t l eads t o homogenous neighborhoods.

( 16, p . 48- 49 )

"Zo ning se ems t o

be esp e cia lly well de signe d t o assure the misallocation of land."
(21, p. 75)

Through its r es t rictions on floo r siz e , h e ight, lot size ,

densi ties, etc. , it may promote routine mo no t ony i n housing design.
"One of t he mos t conspi c ious failures of sub urban zo ning ordinanc e s

1
The fi l tering effect is the process where peop l e b ecome more
affluent and move to more expensive housing t hereby making more
housing availab l e for t he l ess affluent.
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cat be observed in the endless streets of look-alike houses do tting
th< landscape."

(2 1, p. 75 )

When zoning restrictions reduce the availabl e supply of certain
ty1es of land, they also operate to reduce competition in the real
esmt e marke t .

Supply and competition will be gr eater in the ab sence

r aber than in the presence of restrictions limiting prod uc tion.

Since

th e individual producer receives a perfectly elastic demand curve, th is
re rults in a tendency for each producer to prod uce as much as he can so
as :o maximize his profits.

When zoning restricts the operation of

the real estate marke t , it also restricts the s upply of hous ing which
is 1 major problem in the Uni ted States.

(28, p. 247)

Zoning not only limits the s upply of land available for certain
act .vitie s, i t also prohibits certain land uses.

Many communities

sevtrely limit the number of sites available for mobil e homes .

Since

mob le homes tend to be less expensive than other t y pes of single
fam l y dwellings, their exclusion is another way in which land us e
con1rol s create hardships for lower economic groups ,

(2, p. 9)

Ano th er type of misallocation occurs when municipali ties zone too
mucl of their vacant land for one specific use.

Underdevelopment

occ1rs when land is zoned for too high of a use, thus making it too
expmsive and causing it to lie vacant .

(28, p. 124)

This type of

misulo ca tion usua lly occurs when communities zone too much of their
lane fo r uses they wish to attract.

This in turn reduc es supp lies

fo r Jt her land uses and can cause prices to differ s ignificantly from
tho >n in an unregulated market.

(2, p. 9)

"Zoning is was teful because

it ClUses some land to lie idle waiting for indus try that never arrives . "
(22, p. 58-59)
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Once again, Houston supplies some suggestio ns as t o t he effects
of zoning on land misallocation:

1)

in the relative ab sence of

restrictions on apartments, development has

allo~;ed

the market to

satisfy the demand for apartments to a much greater degree than could
occur under zoning controls;
are being used or

~;ill

2) more areas adjoining major thoroughfares

be used for all varia tions of commercial and

family purposes than would be the case under zoning;

3) there are

probably more non-residential uses in interior single family areas than
would he present if these areas had been zoned for strictly single
family use;

4) zoning serves to limit the number of mul ti-family

dwellings in a community;

5) zoning changes seem to be somewhat more

chaotic than t hey are orderly; and 6) zoning tends to give the
municipa l ities greater and more minute control over land use .
p. 14 2- 147 )

(29,

In essence, zoning laws can elimina te from res idential or

other areas, uses which are compatible and desirable .

Examp l es o f

these are healt h services, social services, and foo d serv ice s , to name

a f ew.

This is accomplished by restricting their presence or by

making regulations unreasonable as to permit these services to locate
in th e area .

(18, p. 201-203)

In much the same way that original development is hindered by
zoning controls, redevelopment is also slowed.

Long after neighborhoods

have become dilapidated and all but abandoned , they are s till zoned
for strict residential uses.

The unlovely city isn 't caused by a lack

of zoning, and it is not helped by zon ing.
set of problems.

Zoning laws c reate a new

"Zoning, like all ecosystem modif ications, its elf,

produces eff e cts unforeseeable when the plan is introduced."

(22, p. 59)
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Real Estate Costs
In order for fiscal and large lot zoni ng strategies to have the
desired effects, they must influence housing costs in some manner.
Governmental regulations that impose a cost ove r what would be required
by competitive conditions will raise pri ces .

Zoning laws, when they

require the purchase of considerably n1ore land than market condi ti ons
warrant through minimum lot size
to the price of the home.

usually add costs directly

sta nd ~rds

These large lot restrictions also add

indirectly to the cost of the dwelling by reducing the supply of land
available and thereby shifting the price up.

(28, p. 90-91)

Low

density zoning generally raises hous ing costs by requiring l arger lots
that are more expensive.

Low density zoning also reduces the numb er of

housing units that can be constructed in a given area which may push
up land prices as the number of available lots diminish.

Where these

controls cause a shortage of small lots, demand could caus e a
significant increase in the price of the sma ll lots.

(2, p . 5-7)

Zoning influences the pri ce of apartments and homes principally in
three ways.

First, by controlling the supply of sit e s fo r various

uses, it influences the price of l and classified for different
residential purposes.

Second, zoning influences rents and prices when

it operates directlv or indirectly to reduce or enlarge the supply of
multiple or single family accommodations.

Third, zoning may provide for

requirements that will add to the cost of land and to t he cos t of
construction.

Eliminating these restrictions could serve to increase

housing and decrease costs at the same time.

(28, p . 136)
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By eliminating substitutes for single family residences, demand
for the existing units will increase, resulting in an upward push on
prices.

Many communities, in fact, do severely limit or prohibit the

number of sites available for such thing s as mobile homes.

Since

mobile homes tend to be less expensive t han other types of single
family dwellings, their exclusion is another way in which land use
regulations create hardships for lower economic groups.

A similar

effect comes about when zoning officials zone too much of the community's
vacant land for one use and not enough for other uses.

The areas of

restricted supply usually suffer unnaturally high prices.

(2, p. 9)

In addition to safety and health measures, some zoning regulations also
require garages, off-street parkin8, fences, plantings, and so on,
which also serve to increase the cost of housing.

(2, p. 11-12)

Most of the current literature deals with the effects of zoning
laws on housing costs, but commercial real estate is also affected.
Zoning is one of the many things that influences commercial land
prices .

If the zoning ordinance is binding , (for example, if the

ordinance limits construction to single story buildings where multip le
story buildings would constitute the most valuable use,) the ordinance
is binding and the value of the land is affec ted.
uses takes on higher values.

Land zoned for higher

In many cases, zoning regulatio ns have

fixed allowed uses below potential uses.

When this happens the

property is less valuable than it otherwise could have been.

From

empirical testing, zoning was found to have a significant positive
relation with the value of land.
intensive uses
uses.

That is, land zoned for less

had a lower value than land zoned for higher intensive

(11, p. 44-56)
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Examples of the ef fects of land controls on property values abound.
In a northern California community, a three-acre school site worth
$35,000.00 six years ago recently sold for $3.0 millio n after it was
rezoned for commercial use.

Another exampl e would be of the elderly

lady near Washington D.C. who, last year , had barely enough money for
food after paying taxes for forty-eight acres of idle farm land.

One

day her land was rezoned and shortl y a f ter she received a developer's
check for $1.0 million.

(15, p. 96)

In summary, zoninR influences property values by:
supply directly;

1) reducing

2) by over-zoning vacant land and thus indirectly

reducing supplies for other uses;

3) by requiring "extras" such as

fe nce s, sidewalks, plantings, and off-street parking, construction
cos t s increase;

4) by prohibiting substitutes for certain uses, the

demand for those uses increases, causing prices to go up;

5) by

controlling densities, the natural supply and demand schedules shift
causing price changes; and 6) finally, zoning regulates what may be
built on a particular piece of property.

What is allowed may be a more

intensive or less intensive use than market forces would have dictated

which, in turn, results in prices which are drastically different than
would prevail under free market conditions.

A f urther discussion on

the influence of zoning laws on real es tate prices is presented in t he
fol lowing chapter.
Exclusion and Segregation
Undoubtedly the most emotional aspect of zoning is its abili t y to
legally segregate the housing market.

Articles have appeared no t only

in many professional journals but also in many national periodicals such
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as

~.

Newsweek, and Harpers.

Almost al l of these articles oppose

the exclusionary prac t ices that a re inherent in mos t zoning ordi nances.
Unfortunately, many are
t o the topic.

hi~hly

emotio nal and normative in their approach

Even so, there are s everal articles , mainly in the

professional journals, that t rea t the subject objectively.
As previously stated, one of the most dreaded land use s is that
of housing for low i ncome fami lie s or for fam ilie s with lower i ncomes
than the current r es idents of the neighborhood.

(21, p. 61)

There

seems to be an inherent desire t o preserve the status of a neighborhood,
or to improve it.

Minorities or lower income groups moving into an

area make people feel as though the s tatus would be lowered .

This

attitude has led to the use of exclusionary zoning and sub-division
control as a means of preserving the status quo and avoiding certain
types of re sidential growth in th e s uburb s .

(26, p. 1)

Because of deep-rooted attitudes of fear, hatred, and o ther
s trong emo tions agains t minority gr oups and the poor in general , zoning
has been used as a tool to foster discr imina tion against the poor and
the minorities .

It is no wonder tha t the poor are restless .

(33, p. 83)

One of the acceptable things about zoning laws, from the exis ting
resident's point of view, is that "they provide a legal means wi th
which the middle and upper income groups can practice segr egation without
bringing the wra th of the mo ral ists down on them."

(21, p. 61}

As previously discussed, zoning influences the price of housing
in several ways, most of which serve to increase the cost.

By

enforcing regulations that increa s e construction cos ts and by limiting
the sites available fo r certain residen t ial uses, many potential buyers
are e liminated .

Many communities h ave zoning laws that exclude or
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severely restrict certain t ypes of housing such as apartments, town
houses, or mobile homes which may be the only housing that lower income
people can afford.

·~conomic

(2, p. 7; 28, p. 88)

segregation through

zoning laws is as pervasive and significant a factor i n the housing
market as racial segregation."

(26, p. 1)

A study of the housing market in th e suburbs of New York City
revealed th a t families with income s un ·ier $12,000 .00 could not afford
homes in the subu rbs.

In these suburbs, almos t 99 percent of the

undeveloped land has been zoned for single family dwellings.

Therefore,

most of the area's land is inaccessible to almost 80 percent of the
population in that region.

(27, p. 81)

Another study in Por tland, Oregon was conducted t o see who paid
the mos t for housing:

the poor or the unpoor.

It was found th a t the

unpoor paid a mean rent per square foot of $0.187 while the poor
(people in lower classed neighborhoods) paid $0.219 per square foot .
Proximity to the ci t y center was found to be insignificant in explaining
this relationship.

Unaccounted for in this cost comparison is that

the unpoor renters often had SHimming pools, carpeting, and furnishings
provided while the poor renters did not.

(8, p. 53-57)

Another

article, based on i nformation gathered from 200 rental units in New
Haven, Connecticut, present ed reasons why minorities pay higher rents .
It was determined that landlords are reluctant to rent to minority
groups and wi ll do so only at higher rates.

(19, p. 590-606)

This is

due in part to racial bias which causes other tenants to stop renting,
or potential renters to look elsewhere.
As it became more apparent that some zoning ordinances do not
allow the poor and the minorities the right to better housing because
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of high prices and excessive demand for low income ho using, the public
offic i a l s began to react.

On June 2, 1970, George Romney, t hen

Secretary of Housing, asked Congress for the power to override l ocal
regulations when they discriminated agains t subsidized housing.

(4,

p. 39-40)

As varied groups have generated growing pressu re against loca l
zoning ordinances that bar low income vr oups from the suburbs, test
cases have appeared in the courts.

In J a nuary, 1975, the Supreme Court

ruled against a discrimination suit filed agains t exclusionary zoning .
The court argued that exclusionary zoning was cost discriminatory a nd
that the Fourteenth Amendment did not cover it.

(1, p . 24)

Some of the cases have had decisions supporting exclusionary
zoning while others have been against it.

A Federa l Court in Buffa l o ,

New York, ruled that Lackawanna, New York, had practiced disc r imina t i on
in refu sing to allow 138 low cost housing units to be built i n a ne arly
all white neighborhood.

Alternatively, after a referendum in which

Union City, California, did away with a low cost housing projec t , the
courts s t ate d that no constitutional violation existed but that the
ci t y had the responsibility to assure housing for the low income
residents.

(7, p. 51; 12, p. 62)

Within all the SMSA's in 1960 , the nonwhite households occup i ed
poorer quality housing than did the whites.

(5, p. 32)

As one author

put it, "Why have the cavalry control the Indians and Mexicans wh en we
have zoning."

(12, p. 63-64)
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Conclusions and Implications
Land use ordinances are often criticized for poor adminis tra tion
and for being subject to business and political pressures.

The

following chapters will explore these ac usations and see if these
studies have shown that zoning amendment s are more likely to be granted
than t o be rejected.

Other criticisms a r e that enforcemen t procedures

may be weak or simply are not practiced.

(33, p. 19)

zoning may appear unfair to a land owner who relied on
he acquired his property .
of zoning.

They are:

(28, p. 21)

the tax base.

~oning

when

One author listed fiv e fa ult s

1) it is anti-development;

3) it discourages diversity;

A change in

2) it is exclusionary;

4) it is prohibitive; and 5) it weakens

(21, p. 67-77)

In the words of Bernard Siegan, "It

is time that we applied a clear and unmistakable lesson of the past 50
years.

Zoning has been a failure and should be eliminated."

(28, p. 247)

There is abundant literature dealing with exclusion and housing
costs.

Studies exist that cite the impact of zoning laws on employment

and unemployment patterns.

Much of this work hints or sugg ests that

zoning is good business and that only the rich and powerful
(3, p. 18)

benefit.

Even with all these hints and suggestions , litt le has been

done to determine just what influence monetary and political power
have on zoning decisions and the benefits derived therefrom.

The

following theory chapter will help explain why people go to such
extremes as legal advice and illegal activities (i.e., bribery) to
obtain zoning changes.
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CHAPTER III

THEORY

h~en

exploring the theory underlying land use controls and the

incentives behind petitions for zoning alterations, it is necessar y
to examine the effects of zoning ordinances on the real estate marke t .
If all land were equal and all uses were fully compatible, there would
be only one real estate market, with one supply and demand functi on,
and one price as shmm in Figure 1.
P'rice

p

I

I

IL
0

Demand

-···-~------------Qua nt ity

Figur e 1.

Real estate demand and supplv, o ne ma r ke t

Natural differences in land and location cause some segrega tion
in the market for usable land.

Land that is rela t ivel y f l at with deep

soil and plentiful water is suited for farming.

Land that is nea r major

highways and rail centers lends itself to commercial and i ndus trial
uses.

Residential areas tend to form in sit es that are s et off from
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the noise and traffic usually associated with commer cial loca tions.
Instead of having just one real estate market with one supply curve,
one demand curve, and one resulting price, there are many s ub-market s

as illustrated by Figure 2.
Price
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FARM SUB-HARKET

)<~~~~

1-~-----------------Quantity

Price

COHHERCIAL

~Demand

-------------------~u antit y

Price

)(''

INDUSTRIAL

X""'
'
l_ _ _ _'=~----I

Demand

· - - - - - - - - · - Q u a n t i ty
Figure 2.

'"o• ~,::::;"'"

Quantity

Naturally segregated sub-markets

Not only do the supply conditions differ in each sub-marke t, but the
demand co nd itions also vary significantly f rom one use to a nother.
These different supp l y and demand conditions in each sub-market can
and genera lly do cause prices to differ between sub - marke ts as
i llustrated in Figure 3.
As depicted in Figure 3, industrial and commercial property
generally take on a higher value than agricultural and residential
property because there is less land suitable for these act iv ities.
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Figure 3.

Sub-market price differentiation

As cities pass zoning la"s, the supply conditions in the various
sub-markets are altered, often extensively.

By dividing residential

land supplies into more specific uses, i.e., single fam ily residences,
duplexes, and multi-family areas, zoning laws serve to form many more

separate sub-markets.

The same thing h appens with a multiplicity of

commercial and industrial uses.

These sub-markets,as shown i n Figure 4,

have distinct supply and demand conditions and therefore, distinct
prices.
Through the increased market segregation caused by zoning ordinances,
supply conditions can be much different from those existing in the submarkets under an absence of government intervention.

With this

alteration in supply conditions brought about by land use controls,
prices can be either higher or lower than in the absence of such controls.
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Increased market segregation due to
zoning.

Principally, it is this large price variance brough t about by
zoning con trols that provides the incentives to petition for zoning
changes.

For example, suppose an individual owns a parcel of land zoned

R (single fami l y dwellings) which will bri ng a price P i n Figure 5,
1
1
It is t o his a dvantage to seek a zonin g change to R (limited multiple
2
family dwellings) which controls a price P

2

so long as P

2

P1 .

The individual perc eives perfectly elastic demand cond itions (D
and D , Figure 5.)
2

in both sub-markets (R

a nd R ).
1
2

1

I f the individual

is successful in his attempts to get his land rezoned from R to R , he
1
2
will capture an economic rent of abed.

Since this rent can be

significant, it works as a powerf ul incentive for the land owner t o seek
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changes .

The same thing usually happens as you move from any lower us e

to a higher land use.
INDIVIDUAL

R- 1 MARKET

R-2 MARKET
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i___________________
Figure 5.
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Incentive s to seek zoning changes .

There are ce rtain cos t s which need to be co nsidered when an

individual trie s to get h is l and r e zoned from its present use to a
higher use.

The t ime and effort i nvo lved in sec uring a petition and

presenting it to the Planning and Zoning Commiss ion has a certain
opportunity cost a ss ociated with i t.
are often legal fees involved.

In addi tion to these costs, there

The to tal cos t of securing the desired

change mus t be weighed against the increased r eturns.
I f abfe of Figur e 6 repres ents the costs involved and abed
represents the increas ed returns, t he change is desirable as long as
abed is greater than abfe.

If so, the net in crease would be efcd, and

could s till represent considerable renumera t i on.
Often alluded t o in t he literature dealing with land use controls
are the incentives to bribe l oca l officials or to use other extra-
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Price

Figure 6.

Cost versus potential gains

market tools to obtain zoning changes.

Even with the expenditure of

abfe, there are no guarant ees that the desired change wi ll be gran ted.
It is, therefo re, a temptation fo r the pe titioner to offer bribes or
similar incentives up t o but not exceeding efce of Figure 6.

As long

as th e br ibe is le ss than e fcd, t he proposition is s till economica lly
feasible to the land owner .

In l igh t of the foregoing d iscussio n, it

comes as no s urprise when one reads of large bribe s being offered
members of city councils and planning and zoning boards.

1

In summary, zoning aff ect s the market for different type s of real
es tate by s hifting supply curves thus effec ting land prices.

Also,

by segregating the marke t mo re extensively tha n would occur wi thout
land use controls, powerful incentives are manif e s t which cause the
land owner to petition fo r land use changes .

The se incentives , in the

1
The Chairman of the Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning Commission
was recently indicted on four coun t s of br ibery . "Grand Juro r s Indict
County Planner on Br ibe Charges," The Salt Lake Tribune , Augus t 27,
1975. Section B, page 1.
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form of economic rents, go to those individua l s most capab le of ge tt ing
their product (parcel of land) moved from one ma rket to ano ther .
This process involves several political decisions.

This pap er will

explore some of the elements that possibly influence a person ' s abili t y
to obtain these political decisions in their favor and thereby cap ture
the rents created by zoning laws and ordinances.
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CHAPTER IV
PROCEDURES
Data Preparation
The

communi t y selected for th is study is Logan, Utah .

The city

is l ocated in Cache County in the nor th- central par t of the s tate and
has a popul at ion of approximately 25 ,000 people .
by

~ormon

The area was se ttl e d

pioneers jus t prior to 1860 t o take advantage of favorable

farming co nditions .

Agricultur e is still one of th e principal

indust ries of the cour.t y .

As with the majority of t he

~fu rman

s ettlements in the west,

Logan began with a preconceived plan, th a t i s , with blocks laid out in
uni f o rm size and shape .

Certa i n areas were ini tially designated as

commer cial while others were re sidential.
kind have been in existence as

lon~

Land use controls of some

as the c ity .

In 1947 the city passed it s firs t comprehensive l a nd control
ordina nce .

This ordinance e stablished such things as fire districts

and aninal control.

The 1947 zoning ordinance divided the city into

"i nne r f ire and business distr icts, " "urban f ire districts," and
"industrial fire districts."

Furth ermore, it was "unlawful to keep

swine, ca ttle, horses, or ch ickens in Fire District A (inner fir e and
businesE districts)."

It was unlawful to keep swine, cows, and fur-

bearing animals in Dis tri ct B.

Thes e contro l s were insti tuted "in

order tc b e tter promote the health, safety , mo rals, and genera l welfare
of t h e l nhabitants of Logan Cit y ."
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The first master plan and accompanying zoning ordinance of the
type most common today was passed in 1962.

At this time a Planni ng and

Zoning Commission was formed to review all changes to th e master plan .
This entailed

reviewin~

all petitions for changes in zoning areas.

Upon their rejection, the petitioner could appeal to the City
Commission, resubmit an altered proposal to the Planning and Zoning
Commission, or let the issue die.

The power of final decision rest s

with the City Commission, and in the first years under the mas ter plan ,
many petitioners simply omitted th e Planning and Zoning Commission and
went directly to the City Commission with their requests.

Since 1965,

all requests have been channeled through the Planning and Zoni ng
Commission first.
Revisions have been made from time to time with th e issuan ce of
new zoning ordinances every three or four yea r s .

Current l y (1975) a

new master plan has been prepared to replace the 1962 plan, which has
become totally obso lete.
One objective of this s tudy is to determine the effects of
economic, political and religious power on the ability of land owner s
to obt ain desired zoning changes.

In order to do this, it was ne cessary

to identify all those seeking changes from 1962 through 1974 .

This

was done by examini ng the minutes of both th e City Commission and the
Planning a nd Zoning Commissio n.

From th ese minutes, it was determined

who requested the change, the dates of appearances before the different
commissions, the type of change requested, the address, and the final
decision of both commissions.
Pl anning Board minutes.

Figure 7 presents an illustration of the
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MINUTES OF PLANNING & ZONING COMHISSION
SPECIAL MEETING
Jul y 19, 1962
5:00 P .M.
Present:

(members of)
(the Comm- )
(ission
)
(listed
)

Chairman

Motion made by
)a seconded by (
that subject to the s igning of the Universi t y on the petition, the
follo«ing described tracts of land be changed from an R-2 Zone to a
C-1:

The South 9 rods of th e East 6 rods of Lot 1,
Block 12, Plat "E" Logan City Survey, and all
of Block 17, Plat "E" Loga n City Survey.
Voting unanimous.

Motion made by (
) seconded by (
) th at the Elks Lodge property referred t o in the minut es
of June 13, 1962 be zoned f rom an R-2 to an R-3. Voting unanimous.
Meeting adjourned.

Recorded by (

Approved by (

~ames of individuals have been omitted.
Figur e 7.

Example of Planning and Zoning Commission minu t es .

To verify those requests receiving favo rable decisions from the
Planning and Zoning Commission, letters of recommendation forwarded to
the City Commission containing said information «ere examined.

To

verify the positive decisions of the City Commission, instructions «ent
to the city engineer from the mayor concerning zoning alterations that
were studied.
on page 39.

A summary of these power ratings app ear in Table 1, found
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Once the various individuals or groups were identified it be came
necessary to rate them a s to the i r economic, political, and religious

power .

This presented somewhat of a problem be cause any l a rge s urvey

wou ld have been too costly as we ll as l egal l y questionable.

It was

decided to presen t a list of the names to eigh t knowledgeable people .
These eight people represented real estate interests, city gover nment
interests, religious interests and educational in t erests.

These

people were instruc ted t o assign a power rating to eve ry individual
with whom they were acquainted or knew of.

They were to rate t h em on

a s cale of one to thr ee wi th one representing none or very little power,
two representing some power and three indicating substan tial power.
Every indi vidual or charac t eris tic wi t h which they were unfamiliar
they were instructed t o leav e blank.

Figur e 8 illustrates how the

pe t itioners were rated by th e eight know l edgeabl e people.
Economic
Power

I ndividua l s

Political

Religious

Power

Power

John Doe
Jack Doe
Bil l Do e
La rry Do e
Jane Doe
Linda Doe
Figur e 8.

Power rating s urvey example.

Af t er this informat ion was collected, separa te totals f or each
characteristic of each individual was made.

The number of replies

received was no ted, and the average power in each division was

calculated.

A summary of average power and number of replies received

for each of the 87 cases appe ars in Table 1, page 39.

Figure 9 shows
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how each individua l's data was summarized and recorded.
Total

Replies

Average
Power

Economic Pov.1e r

19

8

2.35

Political Power

16

6

2. 67

Re ligious Potve r

20

John Doe

Figure 9.

2. 86

Example of power s urvey summary .

A data char t was th en prepared for each petit ion wh i ch contained the
previously mentioned information.

(S e e Figure 10 and 11. )

Fr om these

chart s , data cards were punched containi ng all the needed in formatio n.
TI1is data was then s ubjected to a discriminant analysis mo del and two
frequency models.
Freq uency Models
The overall objec tive of t his work is to det er mine whether or not
perceive d economic , political, or r e ligious power aid individuals in
cap turing eco nomic rents introduced by zoning chan ges .

Two methods

have bee n us ed to analy ze the data: a simple freque ncy mo del and a
dis criminant analysis model.
The fr equency model was designed t o compare s ucce ss ratios fo r
g roups of individuals class i fied by power ra t ings .

As no ted, each

individual seeking a zoning change was rated with regard to his
economic, political, and relig io us power s .

The average of these

responses for each of the three categories was then computed .

Arbitrary

power level s were es tablished at leve ls of 2. 00 , 2.25 , 2. 50, and 2.75.
Suppose an i nd ividual had a n average of 2. 31 wi th regard t o economic

CASE:

No. 1

Economic
Index

I~'DlVIOUAL:

John Doe

LOCAT ION:

718 East 900 North

INITIAL REQUEST:

R changed to R)
2

2.86

PLANNING and 7.0NINC COMMISSION
FINAL DECISION:

Yea

CITY COMMISSION
FINAL DECISION:

Yea

PLANNING and ZONING COMM.IS SION

~

~

ll/ 16/70

Religious
Index

Maximum
Number of
Responses

2.S

1.2

7

Number of appearances before
the Planning and Zoning Commission

Number of appearances before
the City Commission

4
4

CITY COMMISSION

~

Tabled for further
discussion

~

Decision

Remarks

4/16/71
4/28/71

12/8/ 70

5/16/71

2/17/71
3/15/71

Political
Index

5/28/71

Public hearing s et
Yea

Yea

~
Figure 10 .

Data chart numb e r on e.

Economic
Index

CASE '

No. 2

INDIVIDU AL'

Jane Doe

LOCATION:

450 West 300 South

INITIAL REQUEST:

R changed to R
3
1

2.21

PLANNI NG a nd ZONING COHI.HS SION
FINAL DECISION:

Yes

CITY COMMISlON
FINAL DECISION:

No

Decision

3/15/73

1.71

Maximum
Numbe r of
Responses

1.71

Number of appe arances before
the Planning and Zoning Comm
Number of appearances be fo r e the City Commission

4

2

Cl'I'Y COMMISSION

PLANNING and ZONING COHKI SSION

~

Religious
Index

Political
Index

Remar ks
Instructed to obtai
a petition with at
least 400 names .

Date

Decision

Remarks

5/4/73
6/18/7 3

No

3/27/73
4/18/73
5/2/73

Yes

w

00

Figur e 11.

Data chart number two.
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Table 1.

Surranary of City Corranission and Planning and Zoning
Corraniss ion
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Ye•

1962

No

No

1.00

1.00
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1.67

1962
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2.5

2.50

1.00
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966

Yes
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3.00

.67

1.00

1962

Yu

No
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1.00
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966
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No
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1.50
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1.00
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1.00
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1.20
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1.00
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10

1964

11

1964

Yeo

12

1964

Yeo

13

1965

Yu

No

2. 60

2.40

y.,

2.40

14

1965

y.,

2.00

1.20

30

967

15

1965

y.,

Yeo

2 . 60

2.00

1.50

31

968

16

1965

No

No

2.00

1.80

1.67

32

968

No

No

No

Yea

Yes

j
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~
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1968
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1969
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1969
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1.25
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1970
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1971
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1.00

1. 00

1.00

2.50

No
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57

1971

58

1971

No

59

1971
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Yeo

2.67

1.67
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1971

No

No

1.67

1.00

l.JJ

61

1911

Yeo

2.67

2.33

1.00

62

1971

Yeo

No

2.67

2.00

1.00

63

1971

y.,

2.ll

).67

1.67
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1971

Yeo

2.6)

2.38

1.00

1.40
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1970

Yea

Yeo

2.63

).00

2. 33

43

1970

Yeo

No

1.25

1.75

1.33

44

1970

Yeo

Yeo

2.57

2.14

1.00

"

1970
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Yeo

2.29

2.00
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No

No

2. 43
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2 . 00

1.00
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1.80
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82

1973
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No

2 .00

1.40

1.80

67

1972

No

No

2 . 00

1. 50

1.00

83

1913

Yu

Yu

).00

2.00

2.80

19 72

No

No

1.67

1.17

1.17
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1974

Yu

Yu

2 . 86

2 . 50

1.20

1972

No

No

1. 50

1.25

1.00

8>

1974

No

No

2.67

2.00

1.00

1972

Yu

Yoo

2 .6 7

2.83

1.40
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1974

No

No

2.00

2 .00

2. 00
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1974

No

No

1.00

1.00

1.00
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1972
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1.40

1.40
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1972

Yu

Yu
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1.00
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No

No
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1.00
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power, a 2.11 relative to political power, and a 1.60 average in the
religious category.

He would then have economic power at level two

(2.25 ~ 2.31), political power at level one (2.00 ~ 2.11), and no
religious power (1.60

<

2.00).

data cards in binary form.
at the first level
were given a zero.
level three

(~

~

This was then transferred onto computer

That is, those individuals having power

2.00) were given a one while those without power

The same procedure followed with level two

2.50), and level four

(~

(~

2 . 25),

2.75) for all three variables .

To further illustrate this, take an individual with an economic
rating of 2.31, a political rating of 2.11, and a religious rating of
1.60.

The individual would receive a one at level one, a one at level

two, and a zero at levels three and four for the economic power
variable.

In analyzing his political power, he would receive a one at

level one and zeros at the other three levels.

In the religious

category, he would receive zeros at all four power levels.

These

twelve variables (four levels for each of the economic, political, and
religious power classes) form the data base for the statistical analysis .
The first part of the freauency model cotnpared the successf ul
individuals against the unsuccessful individuals at each level of
power.

That is, the numher of individuals with no power receiving

zoning changes was divided by the total number of individuals wi th no
power seeking changes.

Similarly, the number of individuals receiving

favorable decisions with power at level one were divided by the total
number of individuals possessing power at level one.
percentage successful at each level.

This gave the

This same procedure was carried

out on all four levels of economic power, all four levels of political

1,)

P""''r, and all four level s of religious power for both the Ci t y Council
a nd the Planning and Zoning Board decisions.
To determine whether or not the frequencies were signH icantly
different, a two t ailed "t'' statistic was calculated.

t= f

2

f

v'f(l-f)

1
(1 /N

1

+ l/N 2 )

l.Jhere:

f1

the success frequency for group (<vith power)

f2

the su.cc ess frequency for group t wo (without power)

N1

the numher of successful observations for group one

N2

tile number of success ful observations for group t wo

with f given by:
y1 + y2
N1 + N2
lvhere:

y1

the number of successful in !(ro up one; i.e., y1

N1(f 1)

y2

the number of successful in gro up two; i.e., y2

N2 (f 2)

therefore:

There are N + N - 2 de grees of free dom in the model.
1
2
This test statistic is used to accept or reject the hypothesis th at
f

1

(success frequency of the power group) is not significantly

different f rom f
\Yards, the

11

2

(success frequency o f the no power group).

t'' statistic is used to test \vheth er or not f

significantl y diff erent from zero .

1

The null hypothesis is:

- t

In o ther
2

is not
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or,

If the absolute value of the computed t statistic is greater than
th e t table value at a given level of significance, then the null
hypothesis is rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted.
The alterna tiv e hypothesis is that f

1

and f

2

are significant l y different

from each other.
Since the working hypothesis is that the possession of economic,
political, and religious power does not aid individuals in obtaining
changes to the zoning ordinances, the frequency model was further
refined to limit each individual t o one power level only in each of the
three areas.

Previously, if an individual had a political rating of

2.71, he would have received a one at levels 1, 2, and 3 and a zero at
level 4.

He therefore would have been tabulated into the success

frequencies of leve ls 1, 2, and 3.

The second method used to compute

success ratios eliminated those individuals with power at the fourth
level from the first three levels; it eliminated those with power at
the third level from the first two levels; and it eliminated those with
power at level 2 from level 1.

The second frequency model would have

treated an individual with a political rating of 2.71 at level 3 only.
After restricting every individual to the highest power level for which
he cou ld qualif y, they were separated into successful (those receiving
favorable responses from the City Commission or the Planning and
Zoning Commission) and unsuccessful.

Once again, the number of

successful at each power level were divided by the total number in
each level to determine the success ratios for each power level of the
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three variables.
Discriminant Analysis Model
The next model used to test the hypothesis was a discriminant
a naly sis model.

"Discriminant analysis is used when N normally

distributed observations on p variab le s are hypothesized to explain an
observed dichotomization of the data . "

(25, p . 402).

In this case there were 87 observations on 12 varia bles (i.e.,
N

= 87,

p

=

12).

The variables were all binary (i .e. , each var iable was

either a zero or a 1).

A "1" is recorded if the individual has power

at the level represented by th e variable or a "zero" if the i ndividual
does not possess power at that level.
The 87 observations were f urther classified into t wo groups.
Group one (N ) contains the successful individua ls wh ile group two
1
(N 2 ) contai ns tho se individuals that were unsuccessful i n their
at tempt s t o obtain zoning changes.

The succe ssful observations N ,
1

plus the unsuccessfu l observations N , equal the total observa t ions N.
2
(31, p. 96)

If perfect discrimination existed along these power ratings ,
those with power wo uld be successful 100 percent of the time and those
without power would be unsuccessful 100 percent of the time.

More

clearly , group N (successful) would be composed entirely of individuals
1
with power and group N (unsuccessful) wou ld be ma de up t ota lly of
2
individuals without power at the level in question.

If no discrimination

existed , group N as well as group N wo uld be composed of petitioners
1
2
wi t h and without power.

The discriminant model analyzes the data to
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determine if the variables used were able to discriminate between
successful and unsuccessful petitioners.

After grouping the data into successful and unsuccessful groups
(N

x

1

X

and N ), the overall mean
o f the t o tal gro up N a long with means
2
2
and
of groups N and N respectively are computed . The s e means
1
2

1

x

are given by:

N

~

t=1

X

X

(~t);

(~t);

-2
X.
1

1

Once the means of each group were calculated, the differ e nces of
the means di were calculated.
with i

This was done in the follow ing manner:

=

I , 2, .. . , p

This was done so that a linear function of those differences di could
be fo und which " discriminates most successfully in a cer tain sens e
be tween the two sets of variahles."

(3 1, p . 97)

This fu nction i s in

the form of:

"The solutions ki are proportional to the estimates of the

coefficients of the l inear function which in t he popula t ion co rresponding
to the samp le discriminat es best between the t wo groups ."

(3 1, p . 97)

This linear fu nc t ion is of the form:

This compute d Z va lue serves as an index of probabili t y .

That is,

if perfect discrimination exists a l ong the variables , tho s e with high
Z values would be found in the success ful gr oup N and those i ndividuals
1
with low Z scores would be found in the unsuccessful gro up.

To
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furth•r clarify this, suppose th a t k
funct lon is Z

=

2X 1 + 3X

1

= 2, k 2 = 3, and k 3 = 1.

The

+ 1X with x1 being economic power, x
3
2

2

being poli t ical power, and

x3

being religious pm<er.

power in all three areas and, therefore,

x1 , x2 ,

and

Individual A h as

x3

are all equa l

to l.
ZA

= 2(1)

+ 3(1) + 1(1)

=6

:ndividual B has economic and religious power but no po litical
power and, ther ef ore

z8

=

x2

equals zero.

2( 1) + 3(0) + 1(1 )

=

lndividua l C has political a nd economic power and individual D
has orly economic power.

Therefore :

zc

2(1) + 3(1) + 1(0)

z0

+ 2(1) + 3(0) + 1(0 )

Aasuming tha t discrimination exis ts along the three variables,
one woJld expect to find individuals A and C in the successful group
and inlividuals B and D in the unsuccessful group.

The data should

appear in th e fol l owing manner:
I1dividual

Successful Group

Unsucces sful Group

A

c
B
D

O· course, it is no t reasonable to expect perfec t discrimination
to exi' t.

One would expe c t a fe•• individuals wi th high Z va lues to

lie in the uns uc cess ful group and conversely, a few individuals with
low Z

\a lues

t o be fo und in the successful group.

l<ith less than

perfect discrimination the data would appe ar s imil ar to the fol lowing:
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Individual

Successf ul Group

Uns uccessful Gro up

6

A

c

5

E
F

5

G

4

B
D
H
I
J

In this case, individuals E (Z=5) and I (Z=l) lie ou tside the
expected group.

Analy zing these unexpected cases is important in

determining whether or not discrimination exists a l ong the te s t
variables .

In this particular probl em four equations were run represe nting
the four power levels.

Each equation included thre e variab le s : one

economic, one political, and one religious.

Four sets of equations

were run for both the City Commission and the Planning and Zo ning Bo ard
decisions.

z

Equation 1 :

Power leve l 2. 00

Equation 2:

Power level 2.25

Equation 3:

Power level 2.50

z

k3x3 + k7x7 + kllx ll

Equation 4:

Power level 2.75

z

k4x4 + k8x8 + k l2 x l2

k l xl + k5x5 + k9x9
k2x2 + k6x6 + kl Ox lO

Variables:
xl

economic power at level one (2.00)

x2

economic power at level two (2. 25)

x3

economic power at level three (2.50)

x4

economic power at level four (2.75)

x5

political power at level one (2.-0)

x6

political power at level tvro (2.25)
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x7

political power at level three (2.50)

XB

political power at level four (2. 75)

xg

religious power at level one (2.00)

XIO religious power at level two (2.25)

xll religious pot-Jer at level three (2.50)
x12 religious power at level four (2.75)
The estimated k. in each equation are estima tes of the coefficients of
1

the linear function that best discriminates between two groups N and
1
N2.

Standard equational statistics are given by:
1)

R2

2)

1'

N1N2 (k1d1

=

+

0

0

0

+k d

)

N
(N - 2 - 1)R
p(l - R2)

(p

1' 2'

000

(p

1' 2,

000

'

12)

2
12)

The discriminant analysis does not provide for test s of significance
of the individual k .
1

However, the relative importance of each ki

can be illustrated in two ways.

rirst, the contribution to the overall

Z score of an average observation is the absolute value of the produ ct

of the discriminant coefficient ki and the overall mean of the ith
variable Xi;

/ kiXi/ .

A seco nd method to determine the contribution of the individual
variable to the overall score of the equation is to evaluate the
coefficient k. times the overall mean of the ith variable minus the
1

sample standard deviation (SXi) of the i
/ki (Xi - SXi)/ •

th

variable.

That is,
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

In t roduc t ion

This chapter is organized so that the results of e ach s ub s e c t ion
wil l be presented fo l lowed immediately by a discussion o f their
inferences.

As noted in t he preceding chapter, two fr equency

di stribution models were used.

The first de t ermined s ucce s s ratio s

at each l evel of power for all three variables .

No attempt was made

to res tr ic t an i ndividual to his h i ghest power level, in this s e c t i on.

I f an i nd ivi dua l qua l ified at level 3, for examp l e , he was considered
at l eve l s l, 2, a nd 3.

The r es ults o f t his s e c tion of the frequency

mode l ar e present ed i n Tabl e 2.

I t s hou l d be noted that one asterisk

ind icat e s signi ficance a t the 0. 10 probability l eve l, that two
asteris ks i ndica t e sign ificanc e a t the 0 .05 l eve l, a nd that three
as t erisks indicat e significance at the 0 . 01 l evel .

1

Success Freq uencies

Th e d ifferenti a l s u ccess f r eque ncie s were signif icant at the 0.01
l eve l fo r a ll fo ur l evels of economic power .

Under the economic

power ca t ego r y thos e individu a l s wi thout s uch power were only

1
Significan ce in this case indica tes t ha t the per cent succes s ful
a t t he leve l i n ques t ion is Sifnificantl y di ffe r e nt fr om the percent
successful at the no power level, i . e . , accept
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Table

Success frequen ci es mea s urin g powe r at or below the
maximum level

2.

FREQUENCY MODEL

Succes s fr equencies measuring power
a t or be l ow the maximum level.
Economic Power

1)

.!2._ucce ss fu!

Power Leve l

PZC

3

CC b

% Unsu ccessful

Computed test
Statis t ic t

PZC

PZC

cc

cc

No Power

22.7

44 . 5

77.3

54 . 5

2. 00

64.6

46 .2

35.4

53 . 8

3.4075***

3.5224** *

2.25

80.0

56 . 0

20 . 0

44 . 0

8. 7860***

6 .8109***

2 . 50

85.4

58.5

14.6

41.5

8.1387**"'

6.1391* **

2. 75

92.9

71.4

7.1

28.6

6. 755 5"'*•

5. 7362** *

2)

Political Power

No Power

27.8

11.1

72 . 2

88.9

2.00

72.5

52 . 9

27.5

47.1

4.1268***

4 .0125 ***

2.25

80.0

56 . 7

20.0

43.3

7 . 4158***

5.8711 ***

2.50

93.3

73.3

6. 7

26.7

6 .1028 ***

5.1699***

2. 75

100 .G

80.0

o.o

20.0

3.9756***

).422l*U

0.1246

3)

Religious Power

No Power

50.0

35 . 3

50.0

64.7

2.00

58.4

36.8

41.6

63.2

1. 42~4

2.25

73.3

46.7

26 . 7

53.3

4.2510***

3. 1431***

2.50

70.0

40.0

30.0

60.0

3.450~

2. 3588••

2. 75

71.4

42.9

28.6

57 .1

2. 7693 ***

1.9712*

Degrees of Freedom "" 85
•rzc ind ica tes Planning and Zoning Cotllllission decisions .
bee

indicates City COili:Dission decisions
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succtssful abou t 23 percent of the time in obtaining zoning changes
f r om the Planning and Zoning Commission.

Individuals wi t h economic

powe: at the lowest level (2.00) were almost t hree times as
succts s ful (65%) as tho s e individua ls without e conomic power .

Those

at de next highest economic power level (2.25) were successful 80
perc<nt of the time before th at Board.

It is important to realize

that as a person ' s economic power goes up, so does his ability to
rece~e

affirmative answers to his petitions.

The Planning and

Zoni1g Board approved 85 percent of the requests f rom individuals with
econrn1i c power at level 3 (2.50) and 93 percent of the requests from
indi\iduals wi th economic power at the highest level (2 . 75) .

Figure 12

presmts graphically the relationship between economic power a nd
abil~y

to gain rezoning requests.

Economic
Power
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BOARD DECISIONS
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Figu re 12.
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Planning and Zoning Board decisions ,
economic power.
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The city government is planned so tha t t he City Commission hear s
only requests that have received affirmative decisions from the Planning

and Zoning Board.

This is usually, but not always, the case .

There

were a few (less t han 5% of the total) individuals who went directly to
th e City Council; of the three individuals attempting t his , only one
received a zoning change.

Also, individuals receiving denials from

the Planning and Zoning Board had the right to appeal th e decision to
the City Commission.

Most of th e time the City Commissio n uph e ld the

Planning and Zoning Board.
The success frequencies for individuals with economic power befor e
the City Commission followed a pattern similar to those of t h e PZB.
For example, i ndividuals with no power were successful only 44.5
percent of t he time (f 2 ) while individuals with power at level 1 (2.00)
were successfu l 46 percent of the time (f ).
2

The resulting t test

s tatistic for these two levels indicates that the null hypothesis that
f2 - f

1

is significantly different from zero a t the 0.01 leve l.

Tho s e

i nd ividuals with power at the 2.25 level were s uccessful 56 percent
of the time.

Fifty-eight percent of the peop le with economic power a t

level 3 were successful and 71 percen t at level 4 wer e s uccessful .
Figur e 13 shows this data graphically.
For both Commissions, economic power was positively related to
freque n cy of approval.

This would indicate that zo ni ng laws help the

rich get richer bv allowi ng them to capture the economic rents formed
by zoning ordinances.

All economic results were significant at the

0.01 probability level.
Political power and its influence on the Planning and Zoning
Commission >Till no>J be considered.

All of the freque n cies in this
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category are significan tly different f rom t he no power f requency at
the 0. 01 level.

Individuals without power were s uccessf ul only 28

percent of the time while those with political power a t the 2.00 leve l
were successful 72 percent of th e time.

Eighty percen t wi th po lit ical

power at l evel 2 were succ essful: 93 percent at level 3 were s uccessful
and 100 percent of those having political power at lev el 4 were
successful.

Those wi th power at the highest level were approximately

three and a half times more successful than those la cking political
i nfluence.

Wi t h a larger sampl e it would be reasonabl e to assume that

individuals wi t h poli tical power at the highest level would not be
s ucces sful 100 percent of the time.

Nevertheless, th is data i ndicate s

that the Planning and Zoning Board decisions are ver y susceptible to
po l itical inf luences .
Figure 14.

These results are presented graph i cally in

As with economic power, the more political po>rer an

individual enjoys, t he greater are his chances of success with the
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Planning and Zoning Boa rd.
ln every case , the City Commission was less apt to ap pr ove a
request than was the Planning and Zonin g Board.

Even so , political

power s eemed t o influe nce the Cit y Commission in much the same way it
did the PZB .

For example, indiv iduals with no power were successful

11 perce nt of the time whi l e individua l s at the highest level were
s ucces s f ul 80 per cent o f th e time .

Those with po litical power a t the

2. 00 level were successful 53 percent o f the time; those with power
at the 2.25 level we re su ccess f ul 57 per cen t of the time, and individuals
wi th power a t the 2.50 l evel were s uccessfu l 75 percent of the time.
Thi s s eems to indicate that the City Commission is jus t as suscept ible
to poli t ical pressures as the PZB.

These results are presented

g r aphical l y i n Figure 15.
Th e more economic and pol i tical power the pe titi oner had, the
easier i t was f or him to get h i s requests granted.

Al s o, all the

econ omic and political fre quen cies were s i gni f icantly d iffe rent from
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Cit y Conunission de cis ions , political power.

the re s pective no power frequencies at the 0.01. level.

This does not

hold for those having religious power at either the PZB or the CC.
For the Pl a nni ng a nd Zoning Board, those with no religious power had a
success freq uency of 50 per cent.

Individuals with religious power at

level 1 were 68 percent successful .

The differences in these

frequencies, however, are not significantly different.

Therefore,

for religious power at this level, the hypo thes is H : f - f 1
0
2
be accep ted and the alterna tive hypo thes is HA: f
rejected.
successful.

1

f 0 must be

This is significantly different from the no power group
Holders of power a t level 3 ob tained zoning changes

70 percent of the time .
no power f r equen cy.

group.

- f

0 must

At religious power level 2 (2.25), 73 percent were

at the 0.01 level.

successful .

2

=

Thi s a l so is significant l y different than the

At level 4 , 71 percent of the petitioners were

This is significant at the 0.01 level from the no power

Figure 16 is a graph of these result s .
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Since the no power and t he first power leve l r es ult s are no t

signi ficant ly dif fere nt and no set pa tte r n is fo rmed f r om th e o ther
result s (i.e., more power co uld mean more or l ess s u c ce ss) , it appears

that r e ligious power has less inf l uen ce on the Planning a nd Zoning
Board than does economic and political power .
Lower frequencies of s ucce ss occ ur wi t h resp e c t to City Commission
decisions a nd r e ligious power.

Those individuals wi th no religious

power were s uccessful 35.3 percent while those a t the very highes t level
of reli gious power wer e su ccessf ul only 42 .9 percent.

Thirty- six

percent were successful a t level 1 ; 47 percent were successful at
level

and only 40 percent a t level 3.

level

resu lts we re insignif ican tly di ff erent from the no power

fi ndings .

In terms of significance ,

Level 2 was signi fican tly dif fe rent from the no power group

at the 0 . 0 1 level, and level 3 was only significant at t he 0 .05 level.
Power l evel 4 was significantly di ff erent f ro m t h e no power group at
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the 0.10 l evel only.

Fig ure 17 provides a graphical presentation of

thes e r es ult s.
Religious
Power

CITY COMMISSION
DECISIONS
2. 7 5
2. 50
2.25
2.00

46

t

36

f
I
~----~~L---~~----~~----~~~-----%
Successf ul
25%
0
50%
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100%
Figur e 17.

City Commission dec isions , religious power .

The City Commission results cou pled with the Planning and Zoning
Bo ard fi ndings tend

t o indicate th a t the influence of religious

power on zoning decisions is

mini~al

at b es t.

Of the three areas

tested, only religious power failed to be significant at the highest
test level.
To provide further insight into the influence of t he three power
variables on the decision making process of the PZB and CC, success
ratios were calculated after restric ting each indiv idual to his highest
power level.

That is, if an individual had an economi c power rating

of 2.79, a poli tical rating of 2.81 a nd a religious power rating of
2.31, he would be eliminated from the first three economic power levels
and restrict ed to the fourth level.
entered in all four power levels.

Previously, he would have been
The same thing would happen with
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res pect to political power.

In the religious ca t egory , the individual

would be eliminated from the firs t power level (2 .00) and restricted
t o the second (2.25).

The individual fails to have enough power t o

make the 2.50 cut off.
Table 3 contains the data from the seco nd part of the frequen cy
model.

As before, signifi cance at the 0 .01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels a re

indicated by th ree , t wo, and one as ter is ks respectively .

The results

are interes ting in that many of the results that were s i gnif icantly
different from the no power frequencies become insignificant or
signi fican t at a loHer l eve l from the no power frequ encie s.

In the economic category, the Planni ng and Zoning Board results
became insigni fi cantly different from the no power results at the 2.00
level .

By e liminat ing those in higher economic power levels , the

percent s uccessful a t level 1 dropped from 65 percent to 13 percent.
On the Ci t y Commission side the percent s uccessful dropped from 46.2 to
13.3.
level.

Both the PZB and CC result s became ins iginf i cant at any tes t
Level 2 became significant a t the highest test level but with

a lower suc cess ratio th an b efore .
succe ssf ul to 56 per cent successful.

Th e PZB results went from 80 percent
City Commission results dropped

from 56 perc ent success f ul to 44 percent s uccessful.

Planning and

Zoning Commission lev el 3 dropped fr om 85 percent to 81 percent while
the City Commission dropped from 58 per cent to 51 percent.

This third

level decl i ne was propo rt ionately much less than the first and second
l eve l declines .
s ame.

Of course, t hose in t he highest level remained the

These fi ndings wou ld indicate ev en more forceably that the

i ndividuals wi th co nsiderable economic power were the ones most capable
of gaining f r om the zoning proc ess .

Figures 18 and 19 give these
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Tabl e

3.

Success frequencies restr icting individua ls to t hei r
highest power level

Success ·fr~:q uenc ies restri c ting ind ividuals
to the ir highest power level.
Economic Influence , One Power Level Only Computed te st
statistic t
%Unsuccessful
% Su ccessfu l
cc

Power Level

ma---ceo

PZC

cc

No Po1o1er

n. 1

4.5

77.3

95.5

2.00

1).3

13.3

86. 7

86.7

55.6

2 . 25

44.4

41.4

PZC

-0.7163

0.9615

55 . 6

3.1619***

2. 7359***
2 .4867 **
4.8326 ***

2.50

81.5

51.9

18.5

48.1

4. 0448***

92.9

71.4

7.1

28.6

5. 7712***

2. 75

Political Influnce, One Power Leve l Only
No Power

2 . 00

27.8

11.1

72 .2

88.9

61.9

47.6

38 .1

52 . 4

2.5333**

3.0888* ..

60.0

4 . 1331***

2.9058***

2. 25

66.7

40.0

,3.3

90.0

70.0

10.8

30.0

4. 3034***

3.61 30 ***

2.50

80.0

~.o

20.0

3 . 4011***

2. 8733***

2 . 75

100.0

Religious Influence, One Power Level Only
No Power

2 . 00
2 . 25

50.0
50.0
80.0

35. J
o.o
60.0

50.0

64.7

50.0

100.0

20.0

40.0

2.0125***

-0.7302
o.9 759

o.o

2. 50

66.7

)).3

33.3

66.7

1.4545

2. 75

71.4

42.9

28.6

57.1

1. 4389

apzc refer s t o th e Planning and Zoning Commission

bee r efers to the City Commission

- 1 : 4552
1.8973*
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results gra phical ly.
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The politi cal power da ta was simi lar t o that for economic power.
At level 1, t he PZB results went from 62 . 5 percent s ucces sf ul to 61.9
per cent while the CC results dipped from 52.9 to 47.6 percent.
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63
Political
Power

2.75

CITY COMHISSION DECISIONS

t

..-·

I

2.50

/'70

(

2.25
2.00

/ 90

./····

f

I

"

/ ' 47

I

0
Figure 21.

% Successful

25%

50 %

75 %

100%

City Commission decisions, political power .

Referring to religious power, 50 percent of the petitioners were
s ucce ssf ul be fo re the PZB, and zero percent were successful before
the CC at the 2.00 level.

At level 2, 80 percent were successful

before the PZB, and 60 percent before the City Commission.
fell slightly for both the PZB and the CC at level 3.

Success

Success fell to

67 percent and to 33 percent for the PZB and the CC res pectively.
Seventy-one percent of the petitioners were s uccessful befo re the
Planning and Zoning Board at lev e l 4, while 42 percent were successful
in ob taining their requests before the City Commission.

None of the

results were significantly different from the no power results for
either the PZB or the CC at the 0.01 level of significance .

The

Planning and Zoning Board frequencies at power level 2 were significantly
different from the no power frequencies at the 0.05 level of significance.
Figures 22 and 23 graph these res ults.
No visible pattern appears f rom this religious power data.

This

adds further weight to the insignifi cant r ol e that religious power has
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on zoning decisions at either the Planning and Zoning Commission level
or th e City Commission level.
In summing up the information from the frequ ency models, the more
economic and political power one has , the easier it is for him to obtain

zoning decisions pass ed in his f avor .

Religious power has very little
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effect on the process of altering zoning laws.

Discriminant Analysis Model

The discriminant analysis model estiflated four equations, one
for each level of power (2.00, 2.25, 2.50, 2.75).

Each equa t ion
1

contained an economic,a political, and a religious power variable .

Tables 4 and 5 present the results f or the Planning and Zoning Board and
the City Commission respectively.
estimated :

In total, eight equations were

four for the City Council findings , and four for the

Planning and Zoning Board results.
The discriminant analysis model provided some interesting res ults .
First ,

regardi n~

significance of the equations, the F statistics were

signi ficant at th e 0.01 level for all eight equations estimated .

Un l ike

ordinary least squares estimates, t her e were no tests fo r significance

of th e individ ual variables.

Because of this, two methods wer e devised

to evaluate the relative importance of each variable .

The first

me thod consisted of taking the absol ute value of the product of the
es timated coefficient (ki) and the overall mean of th e variable (Xi) .
The resulting va l ues provided a way of rankin;? the con t rib ution of each
variable t o the probability index Z by ordering the test values f rom
highest to lowest.

The variables ~lith the highest values of

Ikixil

were re l a t ive l y more important t han those with lower values.

Referring to the PZB decisions, this test revealed that the
religious power variable was ah1ays the least impor t a nt at every leve l

1

model.

see Chapter IV (Procedures), page 32, for a discussion of the
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Table

4.

~stimated di sc riminant fu nctions. J>lanning a nd Zo nin g
Commission decisions

Estimated Discriminant Functions Planning and Zoning Board Decisions
N1 • 47
N2 • 40
Nt • 87

Variab le

Estimate of
Coefficient
k

Pover Level 2 .o

i

Equation 1)

Overall
mean
x

Overall
s t andard
Deviation
5
Xi

Overall
variance

s2Xi

ik 1x(
(rank)

R2 • . 2604

z .. k 1 x 1 +lc..5x5 + k 9 x 9

Economi c

.0079

. 7471

. 1911

.4372

Politi ca l

.0205

.586 2

.2454

.4954

Relig ious

.0045

.2 184

.17 27

.4155

!k1 (x-sX!~
(rank)

F • 7.1890

.0059
(2)
.0120
(1)
. 0010

.0019
(2)
.0009

(3)

(3)

.00 24
(1)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------Power Level 2. 25

Equation 2)

z ., k2x2 + k6x6 + klOX!O

a2 • . 8104

Economic

. 0415

.5742

. 2473

.4973

Politi cal

.0060

.34 48

. 2285

. 4781

.0065

.1724

.1443

.3799

Reli gious

10

F • 16 . 9116

.0239
(1)
.0021
(2)
. 0015
(3)

.0034
(1)
.0008
(3)

.0018
(2)

----------------------------------------------------------------------Power Level 2.50

Equation 3)

z • k 3x 3 + k7 x + k x
7
11 11

R2 • .5746

Economic

.0390

.4713

• 2521

.5021

Political

.0102

.1724

. 1443

.3799

.0083

.1149

. 1029

. 3208

Religious

11

F • 15 .88042
.0184
(1)
.0018
(2)
.0010
(3)

.0012
(3)
.0021
(1)
.0017
(2)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------Pover Level 2. 75

Equation 4)

z • k 4 x 4 + kgxg + k12 x
12

R2 • • 2308

Economic

.0286

. 1609

. 1366

. 3696

Polit ical

.0327

.0575

. 0548

.2341

.0001

.0805

.0748

. 2736

Religious

12

F • 6.3779
.0046
(1)
.0019
(2)

.oooo
(3)

.0060
(1)
.0038
(2)
.~aoo

(3)
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S.

Eslimatcd discriminilnt

functions~

City Commissio n decisions

Estimated Discriminant Functions City Commission Decisions
N1 • 31
N2 • 56
Nt • 87

Variable

Power Level 2.00

Estimate of
Coefficient
ki
Equation 1)

Overall
mean

x

Overall
Standard
Deviat ion
5
Xi

z ... k 1x 1 + ks!'s + k 9 x9

hxl

(rank)

R2 • .2547

F • 7.0558

Economic

.0102

• 7471

.4372

Political

.0211

• 5862

.4954

. 0076
(2)
.0124

Religi ous

(-) .0058

.2184

.4155

.0013

. 0032
(1)
.0019
(2)
.0011

(3)

(3)

(l)

Power Level 2 .2 5

Equation 2)

z .., k2x2 + k6x6 + kloxlo

R2 • .3331

Economic

.0290

.5747

.4973

. 0167

Political

.0053

.3448

.4781

. 0026

. 1724

. 3799

. 0018
(2)
.0004
(3)

(l)

Religious

10

Power Level 2.50

Equation 3)

z - k3x 3 + k7x 7 + kux 11

Economic

. 0225

.4713

.5021

Political

. 0153

.1724

.3799

.0012

.1149

.3208

Religio us

11

Power Level 2. 75

Equation 4)

z • k 4 x 4 + k 8x 8 + k 12 x 12

R2 • .3984

.0106
(1)
.0026
(2)
. 0001
(3)
R2 • .2212

Economic

. 0300

.1609

. 3696

.0048

Political

.0334

. 0565

.2341

h) . 0065

.0805

.2736

.0019
(2)
.0005

(1)

Religious

12

(3)

F • 9.2245
.0022
(1)
.0007
(2)
.0005
(3)

F • 8.2626

.0007
(2)
. 0032
(1)
·.0002
(3)

F • 6 . 1135

.0063
(2)
.0059
(2)
.0013
(3)
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of poFer .

At the 2.00 poHer level, polit ical pm1er was the mos t

important with economic power second.

At the 2.25, 2.50, and 2.75 levels

of poHer, e conomi c power was the mos t important with political power
i n second place .

This variable ranking test <lkixij) provided s imilar

results for the City Commission discriminant equations.

At the first

power rating (2.00), economic power was ranke d se cond in importance.
In the remaining three pmver levels (2.25, 2 .50, and 2. 75), economic
power Has first in importance.

Political power ranked first at the

2.00 level and second in importance in th e top three levels of power.
In al l four equati ons related to the City Council, i.e., all fou r power
levels, reli gio us pmver ran ked last in importance.

The rankings for bo th Commi ss ions f urther strengthen one of the
conclusions from the freque ncy models:

religious power has very little

to do .vith an individual's ability to get zoning decisions passed in
his favor .

A further indication of this came from the estimated

coefficients (ki) themse lves.

In all eight equations (4 CC equations

and 4 PZB equations) the ki' s assoc iated with the economic and
political variables were always positive.

Thi s

associated •lith the religious power variable .

>~as

not s o of the k . 1 s
1

At the first (2 . 00) and

last (2.75) equations of the City Commission decisions, the ki's
associated with the relig ious variable were negative for the second and
third eq uation (2.25 and 2.50) of the City Commission and fo r all four
of the Pl anning a nd Zoning Board equations.
The second test developed to rank the independent variables in
order of importance consisted of sub tracting the overal l standard
deviat i on from the overall mean of each v ariable and multiplying this
times the estimated coefficient, i.e.,

ki (xi- SXi) .

The absolute
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value of this compu tat ion gave a ranking of the variable.
Using this test to rank the variables in order of importance for
the City Commission equations, economic power was most impo rtant at

power levels 1, 2, and 4.

Economic power ranked second in importance

in equatio n 3 (power level 2.50).

Political power ranked seco nd in

every equation but was third for the City Council decisions .
third equation political power

rani~d

second.

In the

Once again, in all four

Ci t y Council equations, religious power was least important.

The second ranking test yielded some peculiar results for the
Planning and Zoning Board eauations.

Economic power was first i n

impo r tance for equations 1, 2, and 4, but last in importance in leve l 3.

Political power was second in importance for the first (2.00) and last
(2.75) equatio ns, fi rst for equation 3 (2.50), and last in importance
for equation 2 (2.25).

Religious power was last in importance for

equa tions 1 and 4, and second in impor tan ce for equations 2 and 3.

A summary of the studies for all eight equations using both ranking
tests showed that economic power was most important t welve of th e
sixteen times.

Economic power was ' second most important three t imes

and least important only once.

Poli tical power was most important three

times, least importan t once, and second most importan t twelve times.

Religious power was never mos t important al though it ranked as second
most important twice.

Religious power was least important four teen out

of sixteen times.

2
The R values for the City Council ranged from a level of .22 for
the fourth equation to a high of .33 for the second equation .
equation had an R

2

2
of .25 and the third equation an R of .30.

The first
Overall,

70
the R

2

values related to the Planning and Zoning Board equations were

greater than those for the City Council.
2
equation was low with an R equal to .23.
was hi~hegt at .61.

Once again, the fourth
The R2 for the second equation

2
The first equation R equaled .26 and the third

2
equation R equaled .57.
2
The R values were somewhat low.

This was in part due to the

absence of several independent variables such as the makeup of the two
commissions, the type of change requested, and the location of the
desired alteration.

Considering this and the nature of the data, i.e . ,

2
cross sections, the R values were certainly acceptable.

It was

interesting to note that the seco nd and third equations of both the PZB
2
and the CC had the highest R

In both cases the lowest R2 came from

the first and fourth equations.

These results are pictured graphical l y

in Figure 24.
2
R Values
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.so
.40
.30
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~

'
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PZB R values
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............. _.. . .....
,_. ...,\

• 20

2
CC R values

.10

Equation
3
Figure 24.

PZB and CC R2 values.
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As mentioned in the preceding chapter, if perfec t discrimination
existed along the variables, those with high z va lues would always be
successful and those with low z scores would be unsuccessful in their
attempts to

~et

zoning decisions passed.

expect perfect discrimination.

It was impractical to

Hhere imoerfect discrimination exists,

there exists some individuals wi th high z scores that are unsucces sf ul
before the PZB or CC, and also some individuals wi th low z scores that
were successful before the PZB and CC.

To determine just how good the

z functions, these "outliers" need to be defined and analyzed .

An

outlier in this text is defined as a Z value lying above the mean (Z )
1
of the successful group or below the mean
group.

(z2)

of the unsuccessful

To further explain this concept, think of the successful group

as being made up of individuals with dif fe rent z scores illustrated by
curve I.

The mean of this group is given by

z1 .

The unsuccessful group

is formed from individuals with generally lower (but not so always)
scores.

This unsuccessful group is represented by curve II with the mean

of this group giv en by

z2

in Figure 25.
NORMAL Z SCORE
DISTRIBUT IONS

Number of
Individuals

Figure 25.

Normal Z Score distributions.
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The outliers were found in regio n A, i.e., those unsuccessful

individuals with z scores greater than

z1 ,

and in region B, i.e., those

s uccessful individuals with z scores less than

z2 .

For equation 1 of the Planning and Zoning Board decisions, the
successful gro up mean

z1

was equal to .02438 and the unsuccessful group

mean was equal to .01236.

Using the previous l y established definition

of an outlier there were 14 individuals wi th z scores greater than z1
t hat were unsuccessful, and 37 individuals that were successful.

There

were 10 individuals with z scores lower than

z2

that were successful,

while 21 individuals with z scores less than

z2

were unsuccessful.

This means that out of the 87 individuals seeking zoning amendments,
24 individuals or 28 percent were ou tliers.
Using the same criteria for

e~uation

2 (?..25 power level) of the

PZB decision, there were a total of 10 unsuccessful ou tliers, and
successful outliers.

1

Therefore, at the 2.25 power level on ly 20 percent

of the individuals were outliers.
At level 3 (2.50) of the PZB, th ere were 6 unsuccessful outliers,
and 11 successful outliers.

At the 2.50 power level, 20 percent

~ere

outliers.
For the fourth equation (2.75) of the Planning and Zoning Board
decisions, there was one unsuccessful individual with a z score greater
than

z1 and

29 successful individuals with z scores less than

this case, 34 percent of the individuals were outliers .

1

z2 .

In

It is

unsucce~sful outliers refers to those individuals with Z scores
greater than z that were unsucces sf ul. S~ccessful outliers refers to
1
those individuals with Z scores less than z that were successful.
2
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part t cularly i nteresting to no te that a t th e 2.00 level there were 14
individuals classified as unsuccessful outliers.
dropped to 10, and to 6 fo r equation 3.

At level 2 this number

At power level 4 there was

only one individual with a z sco r e greater than

21 that was unsuccessful .

Equation 1 of the City Council decis ions had 16 unsuccessful
outliers and 4 successful outliers for a total of 23 percent .

At the

2.25 level there were a total of 16 outliers of which 13 were unsucce ssf ul
and 3 wer e successful.

Therefore, of the 87 individuals seeking zoning

changes in equation 2, 18 percent were outlier s .
There wer e 13 outliers, or 15 percent, in equation
data.

Seven were successful and 6 were unsuccessful.

of th e CC
In equation 4,

5 individuals with z scores greater than z1 were unsucc essful , and 17
individuals with z scores less than

z2

were s uccessful.

This means th at

of the 87 individuals analyzed in equation 4, 25 percen t were outliers.
Once again , in equation 1, there tvere 16 unsuccessful outliers ; i n

equation 2, 13 unsuccessful outliers; in equation 3, only 6 unsuccessful
ou tl iers; in equation 4, only 5 unsuccessful out l iers.

Tables 6 and 7

present these results.
Out of all eight equations only one (the four th, PZB equation} had
greater than 30 percent of the sample as outliers .

Hal f of the equations

had 20 percent or less of their sample as outliers.

Figure 26 presents

the distribution of these ou tliers graphically .

Curve I represents t he

CC outliers and Curve II the PZB outli ers.
The lower the percentage of the observations that were ou tlier s,
the better the equation was.

In light of this, equations 2 and 3 of

both the City Commission and Planning and Zoning Board were the best.

Tab le 6 .
Equation

Tab l e 7.
Equation

An aly s is of Dutliers, PZC
#Unsuccessful
\there
>
1

I Suc cess f ul
where z <

To t al No.
of Outli e rs

% of observ a ti ons as
Outli ers

z1

z2

.02 438

. 012 36

14

10

24

28

.04043

.01 214

10

7

17

20

. 0332 8

. 00672

6

11

17

20

.01139

. 000 72

1

29

30

34

z z

z2

Analysi s of ou t li ers , Ci ty Commis s i on

z1

z2

I Unsuc cessful
'Where

z

. 02699

.014 21

16

.02971

.01300

13

• 230 2

.00806

•

.01335

.0022 7

5

>

Z1

!I Successf ul
where z <

z2

.

To t al No.
of Out l ie r s

% o f obse:rvati ons as
Out li e rs

20

23

3

16

18

7

13

15

17

22

25

"

-<-
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DISTRIBUTION OF
OUTLIERS

% of Sample
as Outliers

I

30%
25%

,J;

20%

Curve II (PZB Outliers)

Curve I

(CC Outliers)

·-. ··-·· ~··/

15%
Equation
4
Figure 26.

Distribution of outliers.

2
This, coupled with the fact that the R values increased up t o power
level 2.50 and then began to drop off, indicates that at some point an
increment of economic or political power had little effect on a person ' s
ability to get a zoning variance pass ed in his favor.

However, t he

discriminant functions were able to segregate the data quite s uccessfully wi th an acceptable amount of outliers.

This, coupled wi th the

conclusion that the religious poHer has little i f any influence,
i nd icated that economic and political power does in fact enable individuals
possessing these traits to get their zoning reques ts ratifi ed .
The results of the two frequency models indica ted that religious
power was unimportant in aiding an individual to receive positive
responses to his requests before the Planning and Zoning Board or the
City Commission.

Analyzing the discriminant functio ns s ugges ted that

of the three variables tested, religion was the least important.

Also ,
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the signs of the coefficients (ki) re l ated to the religious variables
were both positive and nega tive, further pointing to the fact that
religious power fails to aid ind ividuals seeking zoning variance s.
Th e refore , from t he evidence pro vided from t he various t es t s , it was
concluded that there is insignificant evidence for rejection of the null
hypothesis that relig ious power does not aid individuals seeking
zoning changes.
The case for the economic and political variab les was just the
r everse .

From the high success ratios associa ted with possession of

these t wo powers toge ther with the successf ul s egregation of the data
provided by the discriminant fu nctions, ample evidence for rejection of
the null hypothesis exists.

Therefore, the null hypothesis that economic

and political power do not aid indiv iduals seeking zoning alterations
was rejected, and the alternative hy po thesis that economic and
political power do aid individuals in obtaining changes to existing
zoning laws must he accepted.
From the theor y chapter it was concluded that large economic rents
were available to those individuals capable of getting existing zoning
laws amended in their favor.

The conclusion from this chapter is

that individuals with economic and political power are most capable of
get ting zoning laws changed in their favor thus allowing them to
captur e the economic rents formed by zoning laws.
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CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

Land use planning and contr o l s exist under the assumption that
planning is necessar y today to provide for a bett er tomo rrow.

Also ,

zoning l aws are supposedly necessary to control nega tive e x terna lit ies
s uch as traffic, smoke, and noise, and t o promo te positive

ex t e rnalities such as homogenous neighborhoods and convenient shopping
cent ers.

Wha t zoning do es do, as shown i n the theory chapter, is to

c r eat e l arge economic ren t s by controll ing the supp l y of real estate.
These rents become an attractive i ncentive to peop le invo l ved in rea l
estate.

In order to captur e these rents, an individual must be capable

of moving his product from one marke t to ano ther whi ch involves
political decisions.

These economic rent s go t o the individuals most

capable of obtaining favorable political decisions.

This thesis shows

that these successful individuals are people who e njoy considerable
e conomic and political power.
There a re alternative explanations for exp l aining why the
economically and political l y powerful are most capable of obtaining
zoning changes, and, therefore, of capturing the large rents associated
with t he changes.

The mos t prevalent of t hes e ideas is t hat the members

of the Pl a nning and Zoning Board, as well as those of the City Commission,
are more s usceptibl e to the inf luen ces of and the pressures from
powerful i nd ividu als than from non-powerful individua ls.

An alternativ e

explanation i s t hat the less powerf ul la ck the resources to cons tantly
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have someone present at the regular meetings of the two commissions to

"lobb y" in th eir behalf or to bring legal action against the respective
commissions or even to bribe the officials of the commissions.

Still

another explanation as to why the powerful are more successful than the
nonpowerful in obtaining their rezoning requests is that they make the
best proposals.

They are familiar with what is and what is not

acceptable to the two planning units, and therefore, usually do not
submit plans that cannot meet the city's guide lines.

A fina l explanation

as to why the powerful are most successful is that the City Commission
and the Planning and Zoning Bo ard may be made up of economically and
politically powerful individuals themselves a nd that the rich take care
of the rich.
Another interesting fact coming from the s tudy was that the
Planning and Zoning Board approved more rezoning requests at every power
level than did the City Commission.

This was possibly because the

City Commissioners are elected officials while the Planning and Zoning
Board members are not.

Since the ability of the City Commissioners

to retain their jobs is heavily dependent on their ability to make
popular decisions, it is to their advantage to approve or deny zoning
petitions based on public sentiment.

If a large group of citizens were

opposed to a certain rezoning proposals it paid the City Commissioner s
to reject it whether or not it met the sugg ested guidelines.

It

remains unclear as to why the City Commission approved fewer rezoning
applications, but the above mentioned explanati on. is certainly a
possibility .
What does all this mean for the future of land use controls?

It

means that mora land use controls means more incentives for corruption
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and more money for the rich.

1

Land use planning and cont rol can provide

for a more "desirable" land use for some, but cer ta inly not equally for
all.

These controls become a vehicle through which those with power and

money may gain more power and money while providing a way to hinder
those individuals lacking these resources.
Supposing that land use planning and controls do accomplish some of
their objectives (i.e., better living conditions), land use controls
are at best a mixed blessing.

If land use con trols fail to achieve

their objectives as the review of literature would indicate is oft en the
case , they become a hinderance instead of a blessing.

The resul t s of

this study coupled with the review of literature suggests that no land
use contr ols are possibly better than the extensive land use controls
now in existence in Cache Valley.

Currently, many of the county ' s

communities are attempting to s low their grow th. 2

A more sensible goal

of land use planning would be to provide as many home s as cheaply as
possible to as many people as possible,

Land use controls in their

pres ent s tate fail in this aspect.
Assuming the theories underlying land use planning are valid, i.e.,
that land use planning can help to improve the quality of life for the
majori t y , zoning practices as they now exist should be changed.
Private controls should be used whenev er possible.

Since zoning i s a

tool for the public, it should be used by the public.
citizen participation needs to be generated.

That is , greater

Initial land use patterns

1
For a discussion of incentives for corruption refer to Chapter III.
2
see page 1 of the Herald Journal for the week of September 8 - 12 ,
1975, a series of articles on the Cache Valley real estate market.
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could be made a matter of public vot e .

Programs to educate the public

as to why certain propert y is zoned in a certain way should be
implemented.

And finally, zoning changes should receive more public

exposure, possibly through organized citizens groups.
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